Pythagoras' dictum that 'all is number' is well-known. But my impression is that even practicing mathematicians are often not entirely aware of the thoroughness with which we have developed this very idea over the centuries in the formation of our world-view, from the evolution of the cosmos to the structure of elementary particles, and even in attempts to describe the ultimate nature of human consciousness.
view was not very different from that of modern physics.) Now, as briefly mentioned above, there are good reasons for forgetting that our models of the world are so dependent on numbers. One is that any given number or collection of numbers is too restrictive to convey the full richness of the object we are trying to model. The fact that we can use many different numbers, depending on our point of view is the genesis of the important idea of coordinate transformations. Working with coordinate transformations for a while then naturally leads to the idea that it might be profitable to work with mathematical models which themselves are not necessarily a priori numerical in nature. Hence, one now works with, say, abstract manifolds which do not have a priori coordinate charts, but which only admit coordinate charts, or vector spaces that do not have an a priori basis. The notion of an abstract set and its many descendants has undoubtedly given rise to tremendous economy of description and conceptual clarity in modern mathematics. (According to Dieudonne, the definition of tensors in physics texts are remnants from the days when the only sets used in modelling were sets of numbers.) Nonetheless, it is clear that in practice, even abstract objects are conceptually convenient substitutes for equivalence classes of numbers.
Given the discussion above, one might expect all mathematicians to be number theorists, and maybe in some sense they are. However, there is an even more essential reason why most practicing mathematicians can get by with a rather naive understanding of numbers and might be better off doing so. This is because of the extremely useful geometric picture of the real and complex numbers. Much of the time, it is perfectly reasonable to visualize the complex numbers as a geometric plane, and base all other constructions upon that basic picture, oblivious to the fine structure of our objects, pretty much as one can do plenty of classical physics without worrying about the fact that the macroscopic objects we are considering arise from the complicated interaction of elementary particles. Now, my claim is that the role of a number theorist in mathematics is exactly analogous to the role of a particle theorist in physics. That role being to probe the nature of the ultimate constituents of the objects that others study from a far coarser perspective. Thus, in contrast to the continuum picture of the complex plane, a number theorist is more likely to perceive of each individual number or groups of numbers in a discrete fashion, and in nested hierarchies reflecting various complexities, and even attach a symmetry group to each individual number. It is not that number theorists avoid the plane model, since it is also an important tool in much of number theory. It is just that the plane has a much more grainy and elaborate shape, with many levels of microscopic detail and structure. Now particle physicists would be viewed as denizens of a baroque world of their own making if not for the tremendous impact that the theory of the microscopic eventually has on the macroscopic world, and the hope that we will someday have a complete picture of how to reconstruct the macroscopic world from the structure of particles and their interactions. But can we make similar claims for number theory, that such detailed understanding of numbers such as the arithmetician strives for leads to some global macroscopic insight (e.g. for geometry)?
Affirmative examples are abundant. Recall for example the various impossibility proofs for ruler and compass constructions. There the problems posed were evidently macroscopic in nature. The resolution had to wait for a microscopic classification of at least certain classes of numbers in terms of their symmetry groups: The numbers that can be generated by ruler and compass constructions are all algebraic numbers with solvable symmetry groups having elementary 2-groups as the quotients of the composition series. Doubling the cube, for example, would have involved constructing a number, 2 1/3 with S 3 symmetry group. The impossibility of squaring the circle was eventually understood only with Lindemann's proof that π is in fact a transcendental number. (Recall that a transcendental number is a number with an infinite symmetry group.)
This classification of numbers by symmetry groups, which is at present an intractable problem, is still just a beginning of the program to understand how to go from the microscopic to the macroscopic. It is not hard to 'find' all numbers with simple symmetry groups: For example, a number has symmetry group Z/2 iff it can be written in the form a + b √ n where a, b, n are rational.
The numbers with symmetry group Z/3 or S 3 are exactly the ones obtained from the rationals using field operations and cube roots. (It is slightly subtle to distinguish between the numbers with the two different types.) Among the deeper results already known are the theorem that a number can be obtained from the rationals through field operations and radicals iff its symmetry group is solvable, and the beautiful theorem of Kronecker and Weber that a number can be written as a finite Fourier series
with rational coefficients iff its symmetry group is abelian. For example,
This is a prototype of a deep 'parametrization' theorem, which tells us exactly how to generate a class of numbers with an abstract definition. The vague notion I have introduced of attaining a microscopic understanding of numbers should be fleshed out by examples of this sort, until a more systematic program can be formulated.
We note that telling numbers apart by studying their symmetry groups is very analogous to telling spaces apart through discrete invariants. That is, one may be able to use geometric intuition to see that two spaces are homeomorphic, but to prove that they are not homeomorphic requires the use of discrete invariants. Similarly with numbers, symmetry groups provide us with convenient labels with which to unravel their amorphous geometry.
Leaving it to the experts to trace the history of such global 'applications' of number theory, we will move on to some thoroughly modern examples:
Suppose X is a submanifold of C 2 defined by a polynomial equation f (x, y) = 0 with the property that the equation has only finitely many solutions in any ring that is finitely generated as a Z-algebra. Then X admits a hyperbolic metric. (That is, the universal covering spaces of X is the upper-half plane.) Let X and Y be submanifolds of P n defined by homogeneous polynomial equations f 1 = 0, . . . , f m = 0 and g 1 = 0, . . . , g k = 0 with integral coefficients. Suppose there is a 'sufficiently large' prime p such that f 1 = 0, . . . , f m = 0 and g 1 = 0, . . . , g k = 0 have the same number of solutions in every finite field of characteristic p.
Then X and Y have isomorphic cohomology groups in each degree. (Grothendieck) Let X and Y be subspaces of C n defined by polynomial equations f 1 = 0, . . . , f m = 0 and g 1 = 0, . . . , g m = 0 and assume:
(1) The same monomials appear with (different) non-zero coefficients in f i and g i for each i;
(2) The coefficients appearing in f 1 , . . . , f m are algebraically independent, and the same for the g i 's.
Then X and Y have isomorphic cohomology groups in every degree. (Grothendieck) After stating this theorem, I tried to find some concrete non-trivial examples with many variables. I found this hard to do because of the paucity of theorems on algebraic independence of numbers. It is very hard to tell if a given collection of numbers are algebraically independent. For example, it is not known if e and π are algebraically independent! Thus, after millenia of research, even a number-theorist's understanding of the structure of numbers is embarrassingly primitive. (It should be noted that some difficult theorems of Baker can be invoked to produce families of examples.)
More generally, start with the subspace X of C n given by a set of polynomial equations
Let σ(X) be the space obtained by hitting the coefficients of the the f i 's with a field automorphism σ of C. Then X and σ(X) have isomorphic cohomology groups. (Grothendieck)
Let X and Y be simply connected submanifolds of P n defined by homogeneous polynomial equations f 1 = 0, . . . , f m = 0 and g 1 = 0, . . . , g k = 0 with integral coefficients. Suppose there are two sufficiently large primes p and l such that the collections {f 1 , . . . , f m } and {g 1 , . . . , g k } are congruent modulo p and l. Then X and Y have the same higher homotopy groups (Artin-Mazur).
The proof of most of these results are rather difficult, and require the machinery of arithmetical algebraic geometry in a heavy way. I should mention also that there are many results whose statements are purely in complex geometry, but whose proofs require arithmetic sophistication, such as Mori's remarkable theorem that a Fano variety can be covered by rational curves, or Batyrev's theorem that two birational Calabi-Yau Manifolds have the same Betti numbers. Also of interest in this connection is Deligne and Illusie's arithmetic proof of the existence of Hodge decomposition for projective manifolds, a result usually thought to require hard analysis. Another interesting relation to analysis occurs in some recent work of Igor Rodnianski, who studies the Schrödinger equation on a torus and finds that the fundamental solution is more singular at rational times, and in general, the degree of the singularity at a given time t depends on how well t can be approximated by rationals. It is clear that the precise structure of numbers makes its influence felt in many different areas of mathematics.
With this smattering of examples in mind, we will move on to more general considerations, and spend the rest of our time discussing a theorem coming from meta-mathematics, which could be viewed as 'explaining' the ubiquity of number theory. There are at least two ways to view such results: One can be a hard-core mathematician and treat meta-mathematics with the same disdain that the artist reserves for the art-critic, and declare all meta-mathematical theorems to be irrelevant to true mathematics. On the other hand, one can regard meta-mathematics as a bridge linking mathematics to philosophy, taken in the purest sense, and thence to the eternal and most archetypal questions of human existence. My own view tends to be somewhere between those two extremes, but the example I am about to discuss provides such a nice answer to the title of this lecture that it is hard to resist believing in some genuine significance it must carry.
We start the discussion with some terminological prerequisites. A subset S of the natural numbers N is called listable if it can be algorithmically generated. That is, we are requiring the existence of an algorithm which if allowed to run indefinitely, will eventually have any element of S in its output set, and no element of N − S. For example, the even numbers are clearly listable, and any of us can immediately produce a program which will do the trick. The fact that the prime numbers are listable is verified in many introductory courses in programming: For any given number, there is an obvious algorithm for checking whether or not it is prime. Then one can easily design a program which goes through the natural numbers one by one, outputs a given number if it is prime and moves onto the next number if it is not. When one speaks of an algorithm in this context, it suffices to understand the word in an intuitive sense, and take it on faith that it is possible to formalize this notion in a satisfactory way. But for the morbidly curious, I will state that an algorithm refers to a program written in the language whose alphabet consists of the natural numbers and a suitable collection of variables, and a collection of labels (for commands). The allowable commands are one of three types:
This seemingly poor programming language has been sufficient thus far for implementing all processes that we feel intuitively to be an 'algorithm', and it has been shown that the algorithms arising from this language coincide with those coming from a wide variety of seemingly independent reasonable models of computation. The proposal that this will always be the case, so that me may with confidence use the above class of programs for the definition of an algorithm is known as Church's thesis, and is universally accepted by computer scientists.
Here is a rather subtle example of a listable set: take a polynomial f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) with integer coefficients in n + 1 variables. For any natural number t we plug it into the first slot, yielding a polynomial of n-variables. We then ask whether or not the equation
has a solution in natural numbers (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Now let S be exactly the set of values t for which this equation has a solution. It is an easy exercise to check that S is a listable set (One important thing to realize is that one does not need an algorithm that figures out the solvability of (*) in order to list S). The sets that arise in this fashion as a parameter set for solvable Diophantine equations is called a Diophantine set. Another characterization is to say that a subset of N is Diophantine if it is the collection of first coordinates to the set of solutions of a Diophantine equation.
We have just stated that every Diophantine set is listable. Now a remarkable theorem of Yuri Matiyasevich says that listable sets and Diophantine sets are in fact one and the same! This is a highly non-trivial theorem. One needs to shows that given an algorithm that lists a set S of natural numbers, one can write down a polynomial f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) with the property that t ∈ S iff ( * ) has a solution. We call such an equation a Diophantine representation of the listable set. It is instructive to try out some elementary examples, such as even numbers, corresponding to the Diophantine equation t − 2x = 0, or the squares, corresponding to t − x 2 = 0. The composite numbers can be represented by the equation t − (x + 2)(y + 2) = 0
One important example is the collection of numbers that are powers of a fixed number, say 2. This set is obviously listable, but the equation that we might naively want to use to express it as a Diophantine set t − 2 x = 0 is not a polynomial equation. It is in fact non-trivial to find a polynomial for this set, and the study of such exponential equations is a key ingredient in Matiyasevich's proof. ( In fact, what he shows is that the set of triples a, b, c such that c = a b has a Diophantine representation, in the sense that there is a three-parameter family of polynomials f (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) for which the set of triples satisfying the exponential relation is exactly the 'solvable locus' in the parameter space. It had been shown earlier by Julia Robinson that this statement would imply the general form of Matiyasevich's theorem.) If one considers the case where S is the listable set of prime numbers one begins to truly appreciate the uninuitive nature of the result under discussion. But this theorem turns out to have even more surprising consequences: One can reduce the most unlikely problems to problems about Diophantine equations! The key to such a reduction is the possibility of encoding many collections of mathematical objects in an algorithmic way into natural numbers (Gödel numbering in a loose sense), and translating statements about the objects into statements about subsets of N.
As an example, consider the four-color theorem, given a computer-aided proof by Appel and Hakens. It says that for any planar map, four colors, say red, blue, green, yellow, are sufficient to color all its region so that no two regions sharing a boundary have the same color. (The map can be four-colored.) We reduce this problem to number theory as follows: The essence of the argument is the fact that we can reduce the problem to combinatorics by encoding the map into labels for the regions together with adjacency relations, i.e., into a planar graph whose vertices need to be colored in a suitable fashion. Consider the statement P (n) which says that any map with n regions can be four-colored. This is obviously an algorithimcally decidable assertion, because the number of (some obvious equivalence classes of) such maps is finite and the possible ways of choosing one of the colors for each region is finite. We just have to check if at least one of the ways works. Thus, we can construct a listable subset S of N by simply listing all the numbers n for which P (n) is false. Now, let the equation f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 be a Diophantine representation of S. Then S is empty, i.e. the four-color theorem is true, iff the Diophantine equation has no solution. Matiyasevich's theorem is in principle constructive, and in the case of the four-color theorem, one can actually write down the Diophantine equation whose unsolvability is equivalent to it.
Recently, a possibility emerged of reducing one of the most famous unsolved problems in topology, the Poincare conjecture, to the unsolvability of a Diophantine equation, although this reduction is not quite complete. Recall that the Poincare conjecture says that an orientable, compact, connected, simplyconnected 3-manifold is actually homeomorphic to the 3-sphere. Since every compact 3-manifold has a finite triangulation, we need to prove the Poincare conjecture just for finite simplicial complexes with simplices from dimension 0 to dimension 3. However, one can easily enumerate all these in an algorithmic way (Exercise). Denote by {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 . . .} the collection of three-dimensional simplicial complexes enumerated thus. Out of this, one can attempt to enumerate algorithmically exactly the three-dimensional manifolds that satisfy the hypothesis of the conjecture:
(1) One first enumerates the manifolds by computing the Euler characteristic.
(2) Then for each manifold one computes the homology groups using the incidence relations suitably and enumerates just those with H 0 = H 3 = Z and
(3) Now, there is an algorithm for computing the fundamental group of a simplicial complex as well, in the sense that one can find a finite presentation for it. So it might be hoped that from the list we have arrived at after step (2), one would be able to cull out the three-manifolds with trivial fundamental group. Unfortunately, the process for doing this is unknown at present because one cannot algorithmically decide from a presentation whether or not a group is trivial. Nevertheless, the experts seem to believe that such an algorithm should exist for the presentations arising from triangulated three-manifolds. So let us assume for the moment that we have such an algorithm in hand. Then we can use it to enumerate a collection of simplicial complexes {c 0 , c 1 , . . .} which are exactly those satisfying the hypothesis of the Poincare conjecture. Now the key point is this: there is an algorithm, due to Joachim Rubinstein, which given any finite three-dimensional simplicial complex will determine whether or not it is homeomorphic to the 3-sphere. Thus, we can go through the set of 3-d simplicial complexes enumerated above, and put n ∈ S iff c n is not homeomorphic to the 3 sphere. We arrive thereby at a listable set S ⊂ N. According to Matiyasevich, there will then be a polynomial such that f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 has a natural number solution in the x i 's iff t ∈ S. Thus, provided we can find an algorithm for determining the triviality of the fundamental group of three-manifolds, the Poincare conjecture can be reduced to a number-theoretic statement that Diophantine equation in n + 1 variables f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 has no solutions in N.
Before drawing conclusions about the meaning of all this, let us consider finally what is perhaps an even more bizarre consequence of Matiyasevich's theorem: Consider the notion of 'formalizable theory'. This is a theory made up of a countable alphabet and a syntax, a countable collection of axioms and rules of inference. In the early years of this century many leading mathematicians and philosophers believed that 'all' of mathematics is formalizable in this sense, although we have at present rather strong grounds to be pessimistic. In any case, for any such theory, it is easy to put all the well-formed sentences in 1-1 correspondence with N, i.e., we can number them {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . .}, in an algorithmic fashion. One can then also generate all the theorems of the theory by applying the rules of inference in some automatic way to the axioms. That is, the theorems of the theory will give rise to a listable set S = {n ∈ N|s n is a theorem}. Corresponding to this, we again find a polynomial f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that t ∈ S iff f (t, x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 is solvable. Thus, a one-parameter family of Diophantine equations captures all we would like to know about the theorems of our theory. To check whether the 100th sentence in our theory is a theorem, we need 'only' check if f (100, x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 has a solution is natural numbers. As an aside, we remark that these considerations can be used to see that there is a Diophantine equation for which the existence of a solution is undecidable.
What are we to make of all this? We leave it to the audience to decide for themselves what Matiyasevich's theorem says about the role of number theory in mathematics. It should be admitted in this connection that thus far, no significant application has been found of this technique of 'reduction to a Diophantine equation' to other areas of mathematics. Rather, it is usually invoked to illustrate the difficulty of the subject of Diophantine equations. In the absence of more intricate developments from the theorem within the domain of mathematics proper, the importance to be attached to it will remain a matter of personal taste. However, in conjunction with results of the sort stated earlier, involving straightforward applications of number-theoretic insight, it is hard not to believe that there is something about number theory that is very fundamental and all-pervasive within the entire universe of mathematical objects. For years, I've felt the need to deny the popular conception of mathematics that equates it with the study of numbers. It is only recently that I'm returning to a suspicion that mathematics is perhaps about numbers after all. It is said that in ancient Greece the comparison of large quantities was regarded as a very difficult problem. So it was debated by the best thinkers of the era whether there were more grains of sand on the beach or more leaves on the trees of the forest. Equipped now with systematic notation and fluency in the arithmetic of large integers, it is a straightforward (albeit tedious) matter for even a schoolchild to give an intelligent answer to such a question. At present, our understanding of the complex numbers is about as primitive as the understanding of large integers was in ancient Greece. It is tempting to speculate that a precise and systematic knowledge of the structure of complex numbers (in particular a good notational system which would reflect arithmetic properties) will eventually render many problems of seemingly insurmountable conceptual difficulty trivial to schoolchildren in the far future.
The title of this lecture is obviously a bit of an exaggeration. It is no more true that everyone 'should' delve deeply into number theory than that a solid-state physicist should have a comprehensive knowledge of mathematics. A vigorous tension between people who feel the constant need to delve into fundamentals and those who gaily apply intuitive reasoning is an essential one for the health of any science. However, I will finish with a personal recollection of my encounter with the physicist Victor Weisskopf, whose lecture I attended in my first year of graduate school when I was still contemplating a research career in mathematical physics. I asked Weisskopf how much mathematics a physics student needs to know, to which he answered with a smile: 'More.' The general mathematician who has ever wondered how much knowledge of numbers is necessary for research could do far worse than heed the same advice.
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, TUCSON, AZ 85721
